Russia

Forget Barack Obama: Medvedev is already the world’s first metrosexual leader.

Joel Stein recently wrote of the effeminate US Democratic presidential candidate in the LA Times:

“He’s well-dressed. He eats arugula (rocket) — which he buys at Whole Foods… He is, as we mentioned, quite thin. He may only be half-black, but he’s three-quarters gay”.

What a girl! Being thin, eating organic leaves and wearing an off the rack Burberry suit was the best Obama could do?

Once again, as with women’s tennis, robber barons, computer hacking, conspicuous consumption, espionage and racism, it falls to Russia to step in and show America how it’s done.

While it may have stalled a little regarding such incidentals as elections, a free press, tolerance for minorities and business transparency, Russia has made democratic history where it counts: by electing a president who appears to be more a puppet of GQ magazine than of Vladimir Putin.

Take this EASY QUIZ to see if YOU are a METROSEXUAL PRESIDENT!

1. When hosting an international summit, you give visiting heads of state gifts of:

a) Oligarch livers.
b) Silver scale models of the next generation T-90 tank
c) Signed albums of your own amateur photography, which include pictures of ‘Italian cherubs, a rowing boat bobbing on a dappled turquoise lake, ducks, and several landscapes’.

2. What is your favourite Crayola colour?

a) Bruised-Chechen Blue
b) Rib-eye Red
c) Deep purple

3. To relax, you:

a) go shirtless fishing
b) practice judo on little children
c) meditate

4. As a kid, you wanted to be:

a) a spy
b) leader of all the Russias
c) a lawyer

5. Outside of the office, you prefer to dress in:

a) a nuclear submarine commander’s uniform
b) just a strategically placed gun
c) turtleneck paired with a leather jacket

(ANSWERS: 5 Cs or more: Congratulations! You’re a Metrosexual President!

3 As or 3 Bs: Congratulations! You’re the new Prime Minister!)

A cursory analysis of Medvedev’s dress confirms the suspicions: Roped shoulders a la Tom Ford? Check. Waisted double vented shorter-than-average jacket? Check.

High lapels? Metrolicious!

Cheeky school-tie knot paired with uber-spread collar? Like, straight out of Gossip Girl!!!

And don’t neglect those nails!

Many commentators have attempted to paint Medvedev as little more than an extension of his predecessor. Yet nothing could be further from the truth. In a radical departure, the new leader quickly jettisoned Putin’s boxy Brionis and his predictable, precision tied half-windsors.

But what does that tell us about his future foreign policy?

More than you might think!

Vladimir Putin’s preference for Brioni and Hugo Boss suits correlated perfectly with his close political ties to Berlusconi’s Italy and Schroeder’s Germany (Schoeder, too, apparently chose Brioni). Conversely, Putin was as circumspect of British tailoring as of its Berezovsky-shelterin’ Prime Minister.

Unlike his mentor, Medvedev is clearly a Saville Row man. Though we do not know exactly which tailor he uses, the subtly waisted cut and characteristic navy colour (preferred by the likes of Daniel Craig and Prince Charles) of several of his suits, together with his penchant for old-boy style asymmetrical tie-knots, points strongly to a W1S postcode.

Therefore, could the era of hostility and suspicion between Russia and the UK be drawing to a close?

It is too early to tell, but all those sceptical of sartorial power in international diplomacy should note the wonders Medvedev’s style has already done for Russia’s relationship with France.

The recent spat with America and Britain over Zimbabwe and Russia’s continued intransigence over the US AMB shield in the Czech republic have dashed the hopes of many in the West that Medvedev would make a qualitative departure from Putin.

The Guardian’s Luke Harding put it just so:

Medvedev’s hardline comments in one of his first major speeches on foreign policy since his inauguration in May are likely to disappoint western observers. They had hoped that his presidency might usher in a more conciliatory era in relations with the west.

However, whether one defines Russia’s position on these issues as anti-Western grandstanding or pragmatic self-interest, one thing is clear: the Russian press has been covering many sides of the story.

In the immediate wake of the Zimbabwe brouhaha, much of the reaction in the Russian mainstream news was refreshingly critical of the government’s policies.

For example, Vremya Novostei, a liberal but pro-government paper, contextualised the veto with a recap of recent moves by Russia to protect Burma and Sudan against Western reprisals. Then, it quoted Sergei Oznobischev, head of the Institute of Strategic Studies as saying that appeasing pariah states is a sure recipe for conflict with the West, and that the key to Russian great power status lies not in Burma, Zimbabwe or even China, but in partnership with Europe and the US.

Naturally, the government has not loosened its grip on the media, and that fact alone makes the appearance of such articles all the more interesting.

In a recent interview, former White House rebel Vladimir Ryzhkov drew a tentative parallel between Medvedev and Gorbachev. Gorbachev started out as a liberal, not a democrat. He wanted to democratise institutions in order to promote his vision of liberal humanism, not to have a free for all. Similarly, he started off with very cautious economic reforms, that began with a tinkering around the edges and concentrated on efficiency and market accounting mechanisms.

Medvedev has certainly started to tinker. Earlier this month, he announced that Gazprom, Putin’s Koh-i-Noor, would have to start sharing its pipelines with other companies. This was a pretty important announcement, as one of the things that made Gazprom such a threat to Europe was its ownership of both gas and pipelines: EU monopoly regulations forbade such things for its own companies, who ended up outflanked. Today came the news that Gazprom would lay off 500 executives, or 10% of the staff, at its head office.

It is too early to say whether Medvedev has any plans for a full fledged Perestroika. As the closure of the Exile has revealed, he’s not one for free for alls. Yet the critical press line and gentle economic restructuring may point to a liberal impulse that, like with Gorbachev, not only may come to fruition with time, but also be eventually overtaken by events.

Gone are the heady heroin nights of the nineties, and with them, many of the expats who had come East to trade in the drudgery of their suburban lives for a more visceral, tragic version of humanity.

Now that the country brims with the Toyota Priuses (Prii? Priux?), hipsters, libel laws, Time Out Magazine, nuclear families, decent sushi and the other assorted petit bourgeois nightmares of back home, what’s the point of putting up with a scary government and summary bureaucracy?

Indeed, to witness non-oligarchs holidaying abroad, taking up sales and marketing jobs and driving new model Ladas or even Peugeots can be very bittersweet. No matter how clichéd, the question begs asking: has the well-adjusted middle class life that has enriched the hitherto threadbare existence of so many (though still not even remotely the majority of) Russians cost us that self-destructive, protean, brooding, extremist yet spiritual truth seeking poetry - borne of suffering, longing, deception and isolation?

Has Russia lost, in a word…its SOUL??!

More chillingly, has said Soul been sold to a rentier state whose petrodollars drown questions of illegitimacy and oppression in the warm, moist umbilical fluid of light sweet crude?

Not quite! And here’s why:

1. The 90s Paradox:

The libertinism of moral clarity and/or cheap drugs, anarchy and play that the expat rebels revelled in proved catastrophic for their Russia’s own Rimbauds.

In fact, the Soviet enfants terribles of the 1980s: young guys trapped in obscure think tanks penning underground verse or music, hippies and political dissidents who shocked and shamed their bankrupt system in the same way that the Exile shamed and shocked its own, could not survive in the new climate.

Their rock music – filigreed, cryptic and high maintenance - didn’t stand a chance against Aerosmith or the Spice Girls. In a country drowning its collective sorrow in endless re-runs of Santa Barbara and The Bold and the Beautiful, no-one had the time or money for their now-permitted protest literature. Their well paying research jobs, at which they could comfortably sit and write, disappeared. Many sold out; for others, despair and the dulling embrace of heroin replaced the creative kick of vodka and kombucha tea.

By the end of the 1990s, the Soviet intellectual, dissident and underground scene effectively disappeared. In 1998, Claude Frioux had written its obituary in Le Monde Diplomatique:

Russia’s intellectuals are now entirely absorbed with questions of material survival, paralysed by a fear of displeasing somebody, and confused about how to deal with the mafia face of power….They are no longer the small islands of lucid dignity that they once were. They are now an amorphous mass, and outside observers comment dismissively on their cynical lack of concern and their total absorption in the business of making ends meet.

Even in Russia, people sitting in unheated flats and using furniture for firewood eventually switched from questions of philosophy to questions of finding scraps of food; undoubtedly in an homage to Bakhtin.

2. Biting the Hand that Feeds You:

A cursory look at instances of mass intellectual awakening/rebellion reveals that such events generally follow periods of increased material wealth and stability. 1968 is the obvious example. In Russia, it was no different. The impoverished and hellish 1930s and 40s gave way to the staid, authoritarian and materialistic 1950s. Yet before the decade was out, Khruschev’s famous Thaw began. Similarly, the wealthy, even ‘decadent’ years of Brezhnev’s stagnation (few in the West realise that Soviet living standards peaked in the mid 1970s, and that it was the time of every baby boomer’s life) preceded the grass roots rebellions of the late 1970s and early 80s that eventually paved the way for Gorbachev’s glasnost.

History shows that as soon as (but not a moment before) a country raises a generation of reasonably well fed, educated young people in an ordered, stable society, they will immediately proceed to do their best to undermine and destroy that society, tear up its sick, fraudulent and oppressive underbelly, and seek freedom. Before long, they will become bankrupt and bitter or ‘grown up’ and responsible, and the cycle will continue.

Thus, is it any surprise that after a decade of abject poverty and national trauma beginning in the late 1980s, Russia now witnesses an era of a materially comfortable, socially conservative authoritarianism?

Indeed, it would be useful to keep in mind an article by Other Russia leader Eduard Limonov that appeared in today’s Grani.ru newspaper.

In it, he writes that Putin’s authoritarian system will be overturned not by the impoverished masses, but by a growing wave of educated disaffected youth feeling stifled and demanding philosophical rather than material freedom. Thus, unlike with the masses, the regime’s capacity for delivering the goods economically would no longer be enough to save it.

So where is this new ‘class for itself’, these islands of lucid dignity? We don’t hear much about them in the West, but they are definitely out there. In the field, one group is Limonov’s own National Bolshevik Party foot soldiers, frequently arrested on trumped up sedition charges, and even occasionally killed. On the intellectual front, someone to watch is Kirill Medvedev, a young dissident writer, poet, activist and blogger whose work has recently been profiled by the dashing Russian-American factotum and animal lover Keith Gessen in his own thick journal n+1. What kinds of things can we expect from this new generation? Well, a recent essay posted on Medvedev’s site quotes the following poem:

Literature Will Be Tested
—
Entire literatures consisting of subtle turns of phrase
will be tested to prove
that where there was oppression,
there were also rebellions.
By the prayers of earthly creatures to heavenly beings
it will be shown that the early creatures trampled one another.
Their rarefied verbal music will testify
that many did not have enough to eat.

Don’t write off Medvedev’s Russia quite yet.

Sorry for the silence! Been away celebrating Russia’s Independence Day…from itself.

(It is true: 12 June marked the secession of the Russian republic from the USSR. Not only is the occasion modishly Freudian, but it’s also simply a matter of justice: the US has an independence day, and so is Russia to be left without one?)

I’ll be writing a few proper posts filled with reflection (surely ‘invective’?-ed.) over the weekend but here are some things to keep you busy till then!

INDIE DAY:

Not content to celebrate Russia Day by relaxing with a crate or two of Soviet Champagne and a Brat 2 DVD, a rather energetic lot of Left wing democracy activists attended street rallies condemning the government’s treatment of dissidents.

EXILE AGONY:

The beleaguered organ is holding a paypal donations drive to replace its cowardly sponsors. The Moscow Times has the (hopefully exaggerated & premature) obituary!
The epic danse macabre, previously confined to this Blog and a select few other organs, is finally getting picked up in the mainstream English language press, with a vengeance.

Here is a rather good Radio Liberty piece that sums up and contextualises the event.

Mark Ames continues to chronicle the whole dismal affair on Radar Magazine. Read his latest “Russia Independence Day” post here, and weep sardonic tears.

TNK-BR VS RUSSIA BRAWL:

Follow the dirty energy confrontation over oil, foreign drilling and Russian sovereignty! Articles here and here.

Just yesterday I had written a qualified warning against blaming Russian media meekness entirely on the Kremlin. Now, I am really tempted to take it all back.

In a case of unabashed, iron gripped censorship of one of the most courageous, outspoken and thoughtful publications in the country, Russian Federal investigators have targeted The Exile, an independent English language newspaper that has been publishing since 1997, for possible violation of media laws. This crackdown must be exposed and stopped.

I have been a faithful reader of the Exile for much of its existence. Imagine a mix of The Nation, the Daily Show and Private Eye, all written by Andre Breton, on crack, and you will get an inkling of the Exile’s essence.

The paper, edited by American expat Mark Ames, is a fusion of irreverent, insightful, caustically funny, often offensive and always sincere observations on Russian politics, culture and society. Through its gonzo journalism, it has consistently told truth to power and acted as a fierce critic of the American media’s often shallow and prejudiced reporting on Russia. It was one of the few organs to predict the 1998 rouble crash, and during the 1990s, it was often the only critic of the Yeltsin regime and the West’s perceived blind support for his devastating reforms, consistently examining the tumultuous lives and struggles of everyday people through a blend of wit, erudition and scathing satire. Today, it remains an equally strong critic both of Putin and the West’s democracy promoters, while also, in its commentary on Russia, telling some home truths about the West itself.

The Exile’s radical politics, perpetual opposition to the powerful and provocative stunts have made it a pariah, with enemies in Western media circles (especially The Economist), Russian government and business elite groups, as well as in Russia’s liberal democratic scene (especially Michael McFaul). It is a truly independent voice of a whole generation growing up in post-communist times, and has unwaveringly stood up for justice.

The newspaper has also launched some well known talents: its co-founding editor, Matt Taibbi, is now the political reporter for Rolling Stone, and its war columnist, Gary Brecher aka the War Nerd, is an internationally recognised expert on warfare. It is currently one of the only media organs giving voice to Eduard Limonov, the tumultuous leader of the National Bolshevik Party, an extra-parliamentary opposition group whose members make up the bulk of Russian political prisoners today. Limonov writes a regular column for the Exile.

Without the slightest exaggeration, the demise of the Exile would be an unquantifiable loss for Russian journalism.

This cynical attempt to use legal pressure to shut down the Exile strikes at the very core of free speech, not to mention the gut of everyone who cares about Russia and seeks to understand it, warts and all.

Dmitry Medvedev has dropped a proposed libel law that would have shut down publications accused of libel without a court order, reports the liberal radio station Ekho Moskvy.

Mikhail Fedotov, head of the Russian Union of Journalists, welcomed the move, and said that he was sure that Medvedev, a lawyer by training, would have been professionally disgusted by the draft legislation.

Phew!

Here is a Reuters article about it in English, according to which “the move could awaken hopes of greater media freedom under Medvedev”.

All good news. However, seeing that the original bill was submitted by the Kremlin controlled United Russia party, and that there is this great charm offensive underway to make Medvedev seem really liberal, could the whole thing have been an elaborate good cop bad cop routine?

This afternoon, Pavel Gusev, the editor of the daily Moskovsky Komsomolets, gave a revealing interview with Masha Myers and Matvei Ganapolsky on the liberal radio station Ekho Moskvy headlined “Empty Front Pages: What is the Russian Press Protesting Against?”. (Listen to the archived program here )

The policy in question was a recent, subtle and little noticed reform of the postal system. The state post office, which holds a monopoly on the subscription of periodicals and newspapers, had raised the price of such subscriptions by 150% for some rural residents.

Animated and alarmed, Gusev did not mince words. “People will just not read anymore. There will be no opportunity to have access to the press…It is a violation of freedom of speech”, he said during the Razvorot (Turn-Around) program broadcast on May 20.

So what made the veteran editor, along with the leadership of just about every major Russian daily, practically equate such apparently banal postal machinations to Politkovskaya’s murder?

Because the fare hike would have put newspapers and magazines out of the financial reach of large numbers of Russians, especially those living in the heartlands who rely on subscriptions for most of their news, Gusev claimed it amounted to state censorship of the press.

Gusev rejected any economic motive behind the price rises, saying that as a monopoly provider of subscriptions, the government and its postal system must guarantee access to information. He then called for an increase in the postal subsidy.

So should Russia’s remaining subscribers brace themselves for a spate of blank front pages tomorrow morning?

Not quite yet. It seems that on the eleventh hour, the protest was called off after the “most senior authorities” signalled a possible change of heart, or at least a willingness to negotiate. Talks between the press and the new Press and Media minister are to be held on Thursday, and Gusev is confident of a productive outcome.

For Russia watchers keen to decipher the direction and inclinations of the new president, the incident provides some tantalising, if contradictory, glimpses. Did this subscription hike mark the beginning of a new phase in the ongoing onslaught on the press, with smoother, more stealth tactics replacing Putin’s heavy handed bullying? Or did the authorities’ back-down and willingness to seriously negotiate with the intelligentsia give us the first taste of potentially radical political changes to come?

We’ll keep you posted…

In his first speech as Russia’s new president, Dimitri Medvedev pledged to use his tenure in office to protect and expand economic and civil freedom in the country. But amid the pomp and circumstance surrounding his May 7, 2008, inauguration in the Kremlin’s opulent Saint Andrew’s Hall, observers are raising questions about whether Medvedev’s new administration will actually lead Russia on a parallel course to that of his predecessor, Vladimir Putin.

These questions were made all the more prescient after Medvedev fulfilled expectations and nominated Putin for the Prime Minister’s post within hours of the swearing-in ceremony, allowing Putin to retain influence through certain executive powers granted to the Prime Minister in Russia’s system. The world will be focused on the policy course that Medvedev steers Russia in, particularly since the cast of other international leaders will be changing over the coming year. As of January 2009, those changes will include U.S. President George W. Bush, who today voiced enthusiasm for working with Medvedev in his remaining time in office.

After President Bush’s departure however, his successor will have to work with Medvedev on the future relationship between the United States and Russia. Read this Council on Foreign Relations article to learn more about where Senators Clinton, Obama, and McCain stand on U.S. diplomacy with Russia.

The election of Dmitry Medvedev as the new president of Russia on March 2nd has been met with mixed reviews from leaders around the world. While many congratulated Medvedev on his victory and voiced hopes for a positive international working relationship with him, these salutations were matched by concerns over how the Russian elections were conducted. The German government called into question whether the election processes neglected democratic principals, but said that Chancellor Angela Merkel still looked forward to meeting with the new leader on her scheduled March 8th visit to Moscow, and that the election reflected the German people’s desire for “continuity and stability.”

According to the U.K.’s Guardian, France echoed Germany’s concerns over Russia’s democratic process, but the outcome was greeted with a phone call from President Nicholas Sarkozy to Medvedev the day after his election inviting him to France, and the new Russian president pledged to maintain a relationship of “confidence and openness” between the two countries. In part, France’s acceptance came in line with the United Kingdom and the European Union. Britain’s relationship with Russia was strained under Putin, but the U.K. government expressed its hopes for a more cooperative interaction.

Reactions from former Soviet sphere of influence were as mixed as their European counterparts. The Czech foreign minister aired “regret” that the Russian elections had not been as open as preferred, and the opposition party claimed that the election threatened the future of Russian democracy altogether. Meanwhile, a group of election observers from Belarus said that the process was compliant to Russia’s constitution and laws.

In the United States, the 2008 presidential candidates reacted to the Russian election results with their own doubts. According to this article by Kommersant, one of Russia’s daily online newspapers, New York Senator Hillary Clinton said that the election marked a “retreat” from democracy, while Illinois Senator Barack Obama named the lack of free media and the repression of opposition political parties as reasons for his disappointment over Medvedev’s victory. Arizona Senator John McCain voiced the harshest criticism however, stating in a press conference that the Russian elections were “clearly rigged.”

Finally, an editorial in the Financial Times recommends that the West be open to a Medvedev presidency in the hope of improving relations with Russia. An interactive slideshow documents one journalist’s travels on the Trans-Siberian Railroad to uncover why Vladimir Putin has garnered so much support for himself and his political allies.