Russia

Just yesterday I had written a qualified warning against blaming Russian media meekness entirely on the Kremlin. Now, I am really tempted to take it all back.

In a case of unabashed, iron gripped censorship of one of the most courageous, outspoken and thoughtful publications in the country, Russian Federal investigators have targeted The Exile, an independent English language newspaper that has been publishing since 1997, for possible violation of media laws. This crackdown must be exposed and stopped.

I have been a faithful reader of the Exile for much of its existence. Imagine a mix of The Nation, the Daily Show and Private Eye, all written by Andre Breton, on crack, and you will get an inkling of the Exile’s essence.

The paper, edited by American expat Mark Ames, is a fusion of irreverent, insightful, caustically funny, often offensive and always sincere observations on Russian politics, culture and society. Through its gonzo journalism, it has consistently told truth to power and acted as a fierce critic of the American media’s often shallow and prejudiced reporting on Russia. It was one of the few organs to predict the 1998 rouble crash, and during the 1990s, it was often the only critic of the Yeltsin regime and the West’s perceived blind support for his devastating reforms, consistently examining the tumultuous lives and struggles of everyday people through a blend of wit, erudition and scathing satire. Today, it remains an equally strong critic both of Putin and the West’s democracy promoters, while also, in its commentary on Russia, telling some home truths about the West itself.

The Exile’s radical politics, perpetual opposition to the powerful and provocative stunts have made it a pariah, with enemies in Western media circles (especially The Economist), Russian government and business elite groups, as well as in Russia’s liberal democratic scene (especially Michael McFaul). It is a truly independent voice of a whole generation growing up in post-communist times, and has unwaveringly stood up for justice.

The newspaper has also launched some well known talents: its co-founding editor, Matt Taibbi, is now the political reporter for Rolling Stone, and its war columnist, Gary Brecher aka the War Nerd, is an internationally recognised expert on warfare. It is currently one of the only media organs giving voice to Eduard Limonov, the tumultuous leader of the National Bolshevik Party, an extra-parliamentary opposition group whose members make up the bulk of Russian political prisoners today. Limonov writes a regular column for the Exile.

Without the slightest exaggeration, the demise of the Exile would be an unquantifiable loss for Russian journalism.

This cynical attempt to use legal pressure to shut down the Exile strikes at the very core of free speech, not to mention the gut of everyone who cares about Russia and seeks to understand it, warts and all.

Today’s New York Times carries on its front page an article all about how the Kremlin silences its opponents in the media. Now, it appears, the Russian government is even adopting Stalin-era airbrushing to literally photoshop people with uncomfortably critical views out of already-recorded shows.

Everything in the article is true (and, frankly, something that most people had already known for years) and the NY Times is right to be worried about Russian press freedom, which is being objectively scaled back.

Yet the total lack of any context in the article can cause some misleading conclusions to be made. Allow me to fill in the gaps.

1. The article makes it sound as if media black-lists, or ‘Stop-Lists’, exist only in Putin era Russia. In fact, that practice is widespread in the US media, too, and especially during times of high presidential ratings and nationalist feeling (which were very high in America in 2003-2004, and are now very high in Russia). How many times have you seen someone like Kucinich or Norman Finkelstein on the CBS evening news?

For example, CNN’s Jessica Yellin recently revealed that in the run-up to the Iraq war, she was pressured by executives to carry positive stories and drop negative ones about the popular Bush administration. In fact, as a study of US network coverage by the left leaning media criticism think-tank FAIR reveals, in the run up to the Iraq war,

More than two-thirds (267 out of 393) of the guests featured were from the United States. Of the U.S. guests, a striking 75 percent (199) were either current or former government or military officials. Only one of the official U.S. sources– Sen. Edward Kennedy (D.-Mass.)– expressed skepticism or opposition to the war.

Therefore, in the US as in Russia, commercial media organisations routinely ’self-censor’ opposition to popular or strong executive administrations, without any ‘overt’ strong-arming from the government. Vladimir Putin is both extremely popular among Russians and very strong in terms of political power, so it is to some extent to be expected that Russian media organisations will take that into account when booking guests.

2. The article lacks some nuance about the state of press censorship in Russia. The crackdown on press freedom, like most abuses of power in Russia, exists as an indirect consequence of the coersive social, economic and power relationships in the country, rather than a blunt edict from the Kremlin. Social: the nationalistic feeling, strong support of Putin and general attitude of intolerance to dissent in recent years means that there are actually few vocal social figures willing to jeopardise their mainstream careers to go on the air and voice opposition to the authorities. Russian media society is saturated, as in any country, with sychophants espousing conventional wisdom and unwilling to voice overly controversial positions challenging authority. Why would a network go to the trouble of finding dissident guests and antagonising its relationship with a popular government and lucrative advertisers? It is more profitable and easier to play it safe and avoid political controversy by having headache proof guests. Conversely, media authorities and overzealous apparatchiks are very keen to avoid and dissipate those controversial statements that do get made on air in order to curry favour with the Kremlin higher-ups. The complacent, symbiotic relationship between a patriotic press corps; a weak, obedient civil society; and the dominant economic motive keeps the media in line better than any iron-fisted police tactics.

3. Attacks on press freedom did not start with Putin. In fact, the tradition of media coercion and journalist killings started in the middle of the ‘democratic’ Yeltsin era. Most glaringly, the liberal station NTV has admitted to having signed a Faustian pact with Yeltsin to broadcast propaganda on his behalf during the 1996 presidential campaign and withhold airtime from his opponents, the Communists:

“During the decisive 1996 presidential elections, in which Boris Yeltsin beat back a seriouschallenge from Communist Gennady Zyuganov, oligarch-controlled “independent media” played a decisive role in Yeltsin’s come-from-behind victory. NTV eschewed its independent character to become a propaganda arm of the Yeltsin team, and, in a staggering conflict of interest, NTV’s president became media coordinator for the Yeltsin team…Whenever its Kremlin paymasters were seriously threatened, as during the 1996 presidential elections or the 1999 legislative balloting (after which Putin first cultivated a pliant parliamentary majority), the media became a propaganda arm for the administration”. (Jonathan Weiler, Foreign Policy in Focus)

And herein lies perhaps the essential part to take away from all this: Russians are shedding very few tears about the demise of the liberal independent media, because that media let them down when they really needed it–1996 to name but one date. It has not been an honest broker in the past, throwing its lot with the despised oligarchs and Yeltsin era liberals, and that is one reason why Russians are not standing up to defend it against attacks from Putin.

Also worth noting: for every Anna Politkovskaya of the Putin regime, scores of journalists perished for their reporting in the ‘liberal’1990s. In fact, according to an analysis by the British weekly New Statesman, 27 journalists were killed under Yeltsin to 16 under Putin.

Dmitry Medvedev has dropped a proposed libel law that would have shut down publications accused of libel without a court order, reports the liberal radio station Ekho Moskvy.

Mikhail Fedotov, head of the Russian Union of Journalists, welcomed the move, and said that he was sure that Medvedev, a lawyer by training, would have been professionally disgusted by the draft legislation.

Phew!

Here is a Reuters article about it in English, according to which “the move could awaken hopes of greater media freedom under Medvedev”.

All good news. However, seeing that the original bill was submitted by the Kremlin controlled United Russia party, and that there is this great charm offensive underway to make Medvedev seem really liberal, could the whole thing have been an elaborate good cop bad cop routine?

A few years after leaving his post, a once faithful minion publishes a sensational tell-all story that sends shock waves all through the nation’s capital. Its revelations not only stab his ex-boss in the back, but cast doubt on the integrity of the entire administration, the robstness of the media, and the state of the political process itself.

If you’ve just screamed “SCOTT MCCLELLAN!”, you’re reading the wrong blog, mate!

No, this is the story of Vladimir Milov, a former deputy oil minister during Putin’s first term, whose latest work, Putin -The Results: An Independent Expert Report (2008), co-authored with Boris Nemtsov, has got even the most seasoned Russia watchers’ knickers in a twist.

Sean Guillory, of the excellent Sean’s Russia Blog, has written a typically illuminating account. So, unplug the CSPAN and go read all about this “devastating” tour de force!

Today, minister-cum-democracy activist Mikhail Kasyanov met in Chelyabinsk with supporters of his People’s Democratic Union party, part of the Other Russia umbrella movement. They hosted a round table discussion on “The Effects of Political Monopolisation”, it was reported on the Radio Liberty website.

But who is Kasyanov and what does he want? Ill be posting regular thoughts on the man and the wider Russian democracy movement over these days.

In yesterday’s Guardian, their Moscow correspondent Luke Harding posted an interview with Litvinenko poisoning prime suspect Lugovoi.

Unfortunately, far from providing any new revelations or even insights, the piece read like a tired, thrice-removed smorgasbord of conspiracy theories, hyperbole, tired stereotypes and faintly disguised jingoism at Russia’s ostensible failure to cooperate with the British authorities.

Harding was a bit lazy. Before writing the article, he should have at least consulted this much more deeply researched and considered constribution from Mary Dejevsky that came out barely three weeks ago in the Independent. Maybe then he would have either realised the redundancy of his own ‘effort’ (don’t be deceived: a Lugovoi interview is hardly a scoop, as he gives them regularly), tried to contribute something original, or simply copied it.

It would certainly have also helped to investigate and scrutinise a little more the English authorities’ and Berezovsky’s sides of the story.

Harding’s piece reminded me of a story that used to run every year, without fail, in the otherwise excellent Moscow Times, about Russia’s ‘quaint’ annual water mains repairs that turn off hot water supplies for weeks on end in the autumn in preparation for winter. The annual article, unphased by any new developments, insights or changes that may have actually occured in real life since 1991, was more an opportunity to rehash old ‘funny’ prejudices about what a weird and byzantine country Russia is than to inform and stimulate thought.

This afternoon, Pavel Gusev, the editor of the daily Moskovsky Komsomolets, gave a revealing interview with Masha Myers and Matvei Ganapolsky on the liberal radio station Ekho Moskvy headlined “Empty Front Pages: What is the Russian Press Protesting Against?”. (Listen to the archived program here )

The policy in question was a recent, subtle and little noticed reform of the postal system. The state post office, which holds a monopoly on the subscription of periodicals and newspapers, had raised the price of such subscriptions by 150% for some rural residents.

Animated and alarmed, Gusev did not mince words. “People will just not read anymore. There will be no opportunity to have access to the press…It is a violation of freedom of speech”, he said during the Razvorot (Turn-Around) program broadcast on May 20.

So what made the veteran editor, along with the leadership of just about every major Russian daily, practically equate such apparently banal postal machinations to Politkovskaya’s murder?

Because the fare hike would have put newspapers and magazines out of the financial reach of large numbers of Russians, especially those living in the heartlands who rely on subscriptions for most of their news, Gusev claimed it amounted to state censorship of the press.

Gusev rejected any economic motive behind the price rises, saying that as a monopoly provider of subscriptions, the government and its postal system must guarantee access to information. He then called for an increase in the postal subsidy.

So should Russia’s remaining subscribers brace themselves for a spate of blank front pages tomorrow morning?

Not quite yet. It seems that on the eleventh hour, the protest was called off after the “most senior authorities” signalled a possible change of heart, or at least a willingness to negotiate. Talks between the press and the new Press and Media minister are to be held on Thursday, and Gusev is confident of a productive outcome.

For Russia watchers keen to decipher the direction and inclinations of the new president, the incident provides some tantalising, if contradictory, glimpses. Did this subscription hike mark the beginning of a new phase in the ongoing onslaught on the press, with smoother, more stealth tactics replacing Putin’s heavy handed bullying? Or did the authorities’ back-down and willingness to seriously negotiate with the intelligentsia give us the first taste of potentially radical political changes to come?

We’ll keep you posted…

In his first speech as Russia’s new president, Dimitri Medvedev pledged to use his tenure in office to protect and expand economic and civil freedom in the country. But amid the pomp and circumstance surrounding his May 7, 2008, inauguration in the Kremlin’s opulent Saint Andrew’s Hall, observers are raising questions about whether Medvedev’s new administration will actually lead Russia on a parallel course to that of his predecessor, Vladimir Putin.

These questions were made all the more prescient after Medvedev fulfilled expectations and nominated Putin for the Prime Minister’s post within hours of the swearing-in ceremony, allowing Putin to retain influence through certain executive powers granted to the Prime Minister in Russia’s system. The world will be focused on the policy course that Medvedev steers Russia in, particularly since the cast of other international leaders will be changing over the coming year. As of January 2009, those changes will include U.S. President George W. Bush, who today voiced enthusiasm for working with Medvedev in his remaining time in office.

After President Bush’s departure however, his successor will have to work with Medvedev on the future relationship between the United States and Russia. Read this Council on Foreign Relations article to learn more about where Senators Clinton, Obama, and McCain stand on U.S. diplomacy with Russia.

The election of Dmitry Medvedev as the new president of Russia on March 2nd has been met with mixed reviews from leaders around the world. While many congratulated Medvedev on his victory and voiced hopes for a positive international working relationship with him, these salutations were matched by concerns over how the Russian elections were conducted. The German government called into question whether the election processes neglected democratic principals, but said that Chancellor Angela Merkel still looked forward to meeting with the new leader on her scheduled March 8th visit to Moscow, and that the election reflected the German people’s desire for “continuity and stability.”

According to the U.K.’s Guardian, France echoed Germany’s concerns over Russia’s democratic process, but the outcome was greeted with a phone call from President Nicholas Sarkozy to Medvedev the day after his election inviting him to France, and the new Russian president pledged to maintain a relationship of “confidence and openness” between the two countries. In part, France’s acceptance came in line with the United Kingdom and the European Union. Britain’s relationship with Russia was strained under Putin, but the U.K. government expressed its hopes for a more cooperative interaction.

Reactions from former Soviet sphere of influence were as mixed as their European counterparts. The Czech foreign minister aired “regret” that the Russian elections had not been as open as preferred, and the opposition party claimed that the election threatened the future of Russian democracy altogether. Meanwhile, a group of election observers from Belarus said that the process was compliant to Russia’s constitution and laws.

In the United States, the 2008 presidential candidates reacted to the Russian election results with their own doubts. According to this article by Kommersant, one of Russia’s daily online newspapers, New York Senator Hillary Clinton said that the election marked a “retreat” from democracy, while Illinois Senator Barack Obama named the lack of free media and the repression of opposition political parties as reasons for his disappointment over Medvedev’s victory. Arizona Senator John McCain voiced the harshest criticism however, stating in a press conference that the Russian elections were “clearly rigged.”

Finally, an editorial in the Financial Times recommends that the West be open to a Medvedev presidency in the hope of improving relations with Russia. An interactive slideshow documents one journalist’s travels on the Trans-Siberian Railroad to uncover why Vladimir Putin has garnered so much support for himself and his political allies.